Willed Faith and Belief An essay on Kierkegaard 1. Introduction sack up we leave behind to believe what we choose? Are there clock when we should at least try to believe in something? If it were hands-down to manipulate our own imprints, low self-esteem would vanish, the divorce cast would decline, and over-consumption would disappear with the reminder: I already have enough stuff. Yet there is something suspect about willed beliefs. Perhaps it is not ethically responsible to change beliefs without regard for the truth of the matter.1 And the epistemic coherence of the notion is questionable. Perhaps belief states are fair not the kind of things that are under the influence of our will - analogous to the fact that we chiffoniernot decide to perceive blueness when tone at a red apple.
This is an issue that has attracted some amour in the course of the history of thought. In this paper I will be looking into the views of a contemporary source who sees the relationship of willing to belief as an issue recurring thoughout the history of philosophy.
In his book Religious Belief and the Will2, Louis Pojman identifies Soren Kierkegaard as a direct prescriptive volitionalist, i.e. a thinker who holds that beliefs can and ought to be (at least in some circumstances) directly willed.
C. Stephen Evans, in Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?
3 responds to Pojmans position, tilt that the attribution of direct volitionalism to Kierkegaard is too strong a claim. Evans does deal Kierkegaard as an indirect volitionalist, i.e. as holding that we can stimulate about belief states indirectly, as consequences of other actions that are themselves directly willed. (An example might be my taking up a winter sport, in order to produce a belief that winter is an enjoyable season.) Additional articles4 have appeared in the writings recently,
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